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Abstract. Diffie–Hellman key exchange is at the foundations of public-
key cryptography, but conventional group-based Diffie–Hellman is vul-
nerable to Shor’s quantum algorithm. A range of “post-quantum Diffie–
Hellman” protocols have been proposed to mitigate this threat, includ-
ing the Couveignes, Rostovtsev–Stolbunov, SIDH, and CSIDH schemes,
all based on the combinatorial and number-theoretic structures formed
by isogenies of elliptic curves. Pre- and post-quantum Diffie–Hellman
schemes resemble each other at the highest level, but the further down we
dive, the more differences emerge—differences that are critical when we
use Diffie–Hellman as a basic component in more complicated construc-
tions. In this survey we compare and contrast pre- and post-quantum
Diffie–Hellman algorithms, highlighting some important subtleties.
1 Introduction
The Diffie–Hellman key-exchange protocol is, both literally and figuratively, at
the foundation of public-key cryptography. The goal is for two parties, Alice
and Bob, to derive a shared secret from each other’s public keys and their own
private keys. Diffie and Hellman’s original solution [51] is beautifully and brutally
simple: given a fixed prime p and a primitive element g in the finite field Fp (that
is, a generator of the multiplicative group F×p ), Alice and Bob choose secret keys
a and b, respectively, in Z/(p − 1)Z. Alice computes and publishes her public
key A = ga, and Bob his public key B = gb; the shared secret value is S = gab,
which Alice computes as S = Ba, Bob as S = Ab.
The security of the shared secret depends on the hardness of the Computa-
tional Diffie–Hellman Problem (CDHP), which is to compute S given only A,
B, and the public data of the structures that they belong to. For finite-field
Diffie–Hellman, this means computing gab given only g, ga, and gb (mod p).
The principal approach to solving the CDHP is to solve the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP), which is to compute x from g and gx. We thus recover a from
A = ga (or, equivalently, b from B = gb), then power B by a (or A by b) to
recover S. Attacking the DLP means directly attacking one of the public keys,
regardless of any particular shared secret they may be used to derive.
Over the past four decades, the Diffie–Hellman protocol has been generalized
from multiplicative groups of finite fields to a range of other algebraic groups,
2most notably elliptic curves. Partly motivated by this cryptographic applica-
tion, there has been great progress in discrete logarithm algorithms for some
groups, most notably Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux, and Thome´’s quasipolynomial
algorithm for discrete logarithms in finite fields of fixed tiny characteristic [11].
The most stunning development in discrete logarithm algorithms came with
the rise of the quantum computation paradigm: Shor’s quantum algorithm [125]
solves the discrete logarithm problem—and thus breaks Diffie–Hellman—in any
group in polynomial time and space on a quantum computer.1 The development
of quantum computers of even modest capacity capable of running Shor’s algo-
rithm remains an epic challenge in experimental physics: at the time of writing,
the largest implementation of Shor’s algorithm was used to factor the integer 21,
so there is some way to go [96]. But in anticipation, cryptographic research has
already bent itself to the construction of post-quantum cryptosystems, designed
to be used on conventional computers while resisting known quantum attacks.
Nowadays, Diffie–Hellman is often an elementary component of a more com-
plicated protocol, rather than the entire protocol itself. For example, the TLS
protocol used to establish secure internet connections includes an ephemeral
Diffie–Hellman [118]. But to give a more interesting example, the X3DH pro-
tocol [95] used to establish connections in Signal and WhatsApp includes four
simple Diffie–Hellmans between various short and long-term keypairs. The com-
mon use of Diffie–Hellman as a component makes the search for a drop-in post-
quantum replacement for classical Diffie–Hellman particularly relevant today.
While many promising post-quantum candidates for public-key encryption
and signatures have been developed—the first round of the NIST post-quantum
standardization process [109] saw 59 encryption/KEM schemes and 23 signa-
ture schemes submitted—finding a simple post-quantum drop-in replacement
for Diffie–Hellman (as opposed to a KEM) has proven to be surprisingly com-
plicated. Some interesting post-quantum “noisy Diffie–Hellman” key exchange
protocols based on hard problems in codes, lattices, and Ring-LWE have been
put forward over the years (including [4], [52], [53], [111], [6], [23], and [49]),
but these typically require a reconciliation phase to ensure that Alice and Bob
have the same shared secret value (as opposed to an approximate shared secret
with acceptable noise on each side); we will not discuss these protocols further
here. Perhaps surprisingly, given the loudly trumpeted quantum destruction of
elliptic curve cryptography by Shor’s algorithm, the most serious candidates for
post-quantum Diffie–Hellman come from isogeny-based cryptography, which is
founded in the deeper theory of elliptic curves.
The key idea in moving from conventional elliptic-curve cryptography to
isogeny-based cryptography is that points on curves are replaced with entire
curves, and relationships between points (scalars and discrete logarithms) are
replaced with relationships between curves (isogenies). Isogeny classes have just
1 More generally, Armknecht, Gagliardoni, Katzenbeisser, and Peter have shown that
no group-homomorphic cryptosystem can be secure against a quantum adversary,
essentially because of the existence of Shor’s algorithm [8].
3enough algebraic structure to define efficient asymmetric cryptosystems, but not
enough to make them vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm.
But what should a “post-quantum Diffie–Hellman” scheme be, and how
closely should it match classical Diffie–Hellman functionalities and semantics?
To what extent can the intuition and theoretical lore built up over decades of
classical Diffie–Hellman carry over to these new protocols? This survey is an
attempt to begin addressing these questions. The aim is to help cryptographers,
mathematicians, and computer scientists to understand the similarities and dif-
ferences between classical Diffie–Hellman and the new post-quantum protocols.
The plan. We begin with a quick survey of classical group-based Diffie–Hellman
in §§2-5. We discuss modern elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman in §7; this dispenses
with the underlying group on some levels, and thus forms a pivot for moving to-
wards post-quantum Diffie–Hellman. We review Couveignes’ hard homogeneous
spaces framework in §8 and §9, before introducing HHS cryptosystems in the
abstract in §10; we go deeper into the underlying hard problems in §11 and §12.
Moving into the concrete, we recall basic facts about isogenies in §13, before dis-
cussing commutative isogeny-based key exchange in §14 and the stranger SIDH
scheme in §15. Our focus is mostly constructive, and our discussion of quantum
cryptanalysis will be purely asymptotic, for reasons discussed in §6.
Limiting scope. The basic Diffie–Hellman scheme is completely unauthenticated:
it is obviously vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack where Eve imperson-
ates Bob to Alice, and Alice to Bob. Alice and Bob must therefore authenticate
each other outside the Diffie–Hellman protocol, but we do not discuss authen-
tication mechanisms here. We also ignore the provable-security aspects of these
protocols, beyond noting that each has been proven session-key secure in Canetti
and Krawczyk’s adversarial authenticated-links model [33] (see [60, §5.3] for a
proof for commutative isogeny key exchange, and [45, §6] for SIDH). As we
noted above, we do not discuss noisy Diffie–Hellman schemes here, mostly for
lack of time and space, but also because these are further from being drop-in
replacements for classical Diffie–Hellman. Finally, we must pass over decision
Diffie–Hellman-based protocols in silence, partly for lack of space, but mostly
because at this early stage it seems hard to say anything nontrivial about decision
Diffie–Hellman in the post-quantum setting. We do this with some reluctance: as
Boneh declared in [19], “the decision Diffie–Hellman assumption is a gold mine”
(at least for theoretical cryptographers). Revisiting [19] in the post-quantum
setting would be highly interesting, but this is neither the time nor the place for
that investigation.
Notation. We will use abelian groups written additively and multiplicatively,
depending on the context. To minimise confusion, we adopt these typographical
conventions for groups and elements:
– G always denotes an abelian group written additively, with group operation
(P,Q) 7→ P +Q, inverse P 7→ −P , and identity element 0.
4– G always denotes an abelian group written multiplicatively, with group
operation (p, q) 7→ pq, inverse p 7→ p−1, and identity element 1.
Acknowledgements. I am grateful to Luca De Feo, Florian Hess, Jean Kieffer, and
Antonin Leroux for the many hours they spent discussing these cryptosystems
with me, and the organisers, chairs, and community of WAIFI 2018.
2 Abstract groups and discrete logarithms
Diffie and Hellman presented their key exchange in the multiplicative group of
a finite field, but nothing in their protocol requires the field structure. We will
restate the protocol in the setting of a general finite abelian group in §3; but
first, we recall some basic facts about abstract groups and discrete logarithms.
Let G be a finite abelian group of order N (written additively, following the
convention above). We can assume G is cyclic. For every integer m (mod N) we
have an exponentiation endomorphism [m] : G → G, called scalar multiplication,
defined for non-negative m by
[m] : P 7−→ P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
m copies
and for negative m by [m]P = [−m](−P ). We can compute [m] in O(logm)
G-operations using a variety of addition chains; typically m ∼ #G = N .
The fundamental hard algorithmic problem in G is computing the inverse of
the scalar multiplication operation: that is, computing discrete logarithms.
Definition 1 (DLP). The Discrete Logarithm Problem in G is, given P and
Q in 〈P 〉 ⊆ G, compute an x such that Q = [x]P .
Any DLP instance in any G can always be solved using O(
√
N) operations in
G, using (for example) Shanks’ baby-step giant-step algorithm (BSGS), which
also requires O(
√
N) space [124]; Pollard’s ρ algorithm reduces the space require-
ment to O(1) [115]. If N is composite and its (partial) factorization is known,
then we can do better using the Pohlig–Hellman–Silver algorithm [114], which
solves the DLP by reducing to the DLP in subgroups of G (see §12 below).
The DLP enjoys random self-reducibility: if we have an algorithm that solves
DLPs for a large fraction 1/M of all possible inputs, then we can solve DLPs for
all possible inputs after an expected M random attempts. Suppose we want to
solve an arbitrary DLP instance Q = [x]P . We choose a random integer r, try
to solve Q′ = Q + [r]P = [x+ r]P for x + r, and if we succeed then we recover
x = (x + r) − r. After M randomizations, we expect to find an r for which Q′
lands in the set of inputs to which the algorithm applies.
In the pure abstract, we consider G as a black-box group: operations are
performed by oracles, and elements are identified by (essentially random) bit-
strings. This models the absence of useful information that we could derive from
any concrete representation of G. In this setting, Shoup [126] has proven that
5the complexity of solving the DLP is not merely in O(
√
N), but in Θ(
√
N).
But in the real world, we do not have black-box groups; every group has a spe-
cific concrete element representation and an explicit algorithmic group law. The
difficulty of the DLP then varies with the representation, as we will see in §5.
3 Pre-quantum Diffie–Hellman
Now let us consider Diffie–Hellman in the abstract. Let G be a cyclic group,
and fix a public generator P of G. Public keys are elements of G; private keys
are bitstrings, interpreted as elements of Z/NZ. Each (public,private)-keypair
(Q = [x]P, x) presents a DLP instance in G.
The Diffie–Hellman protocol takes place in into two logical phases, which in
practice may be separated by a significant period of time. In the first phase, the
parties generate their keypairs using Algorithm 1 (KeyPair):
– Alice generates her keypair as (A, a)← KeyPair() and publishes A;
– Bob generates his as (B, b)← KeyPair() and publishes B.
In the second phase, they compute the shared secret S with Algorithm 2 (DH):
– Alice computes S ← DH(B, a);
– Bob computes S ← DH(A, b).
Alice and Bob have the same value S because S = [a]B = [b]A = [ab]P .
Algorithm 1: Keypair generation for textbook Diffie–Hellman in a group
G = 〈P 〉 of order N .
Input: ()
Output: A pair (Q, x) in G × Z/NZ such that Q = [x]P
1 function KeyPair()
2 x
$
← Z/NZ
3 Q← [x]P
4 return (Q, x)
Algorithm 2: Textbook Diffie–Hellman key exchange in G
Input: A public key R in G, and a private key x in Z/NZ
Output: A shared secret S ∈ G
1 function DH(R, x)
2 S ← [x]R
3 return S // To be input to a KDF
6The security of the (entire) shared secret depends on the hardness of the
Computational Diffie–Hellman Problem (CDHP) in G.
Definition 2 (CDHP). The Computational Diffie–Hellman Problem in G is,
given P , A = [a]P , and B = [b]P in G, to compute S = [ab]P .
While it is obvious that an algorithm that solves the DLP in G can solve the
CDHP in G, constructing a reduction in the other direction—that is, efficiently
solving DLP instances given access to an oracle solving CDHP instances—is a
much more subtle matter. It is now generally believed, following the work of Den
Boer [48], Maurer and Wolf [97,98], Muzereau, Smart, and Vercauteren [107],
Bentahar [13], and Boneh and Lipton [20] that the DLP and CDHP are equiva-
lent for the kinds of G that cryptographers use in practice.2 Since solving DLP
instances is the only way we know to solve CDHP instances, Diffie–Hellman is
generally considered to be a member of the DLP-based family of cryptosystems.
The shared secret S is not suitable for use as a key for symmetric cryptosys-
tems3; rather, it should be treated with a Key Derivation Function (KDF) to
produce a proper symmetric key K. This essentially hashes the secret S, spread-
ing the entropy of S uniformly throughout K, so deriving any information about
K requires computing the whole of S, hence solving a CDHP in G. The indis-
tinguishability of S, and hence its security as a key, depends on the weaker
Decisional Diffie–Hellman Problem, which is beyond the scope of this article.
The lifespan of keypairs is crucial in Diffie–Hellman-based cryptosystems. In
ephemeral Diffie–Hellman, Alice and Bob’s keypairs are unique to each execution
of the protocol. Ephemeral Diffie–Hellman is therefore essentially interactive. In
contrast, static Diffie–Hellman uses long-term keypairs across many sessions.
Alice may obtain Bob’s long-term public key and complete a Diffie–Hellman
key exchange with him—and start using the shared secret—without any active
involvement on his part. Static Diffie–Hellman is therefore an important example
of a Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE) protocol [62].
Efficient public-key validation—that is, checking that a public key was hon-
estly generated—is an important, if often overlooked, requirement for many
Diffie–Hellman systems, particularly those where keys are re-used. Suppose Alice
2 Suppose N is prime. The Maurer reduction for groups of order N requires an auxil-
iary elliptic curve over FN whose order is B-smooth—that is, such that every prime
dividing the order of the auxiliary curve is less than B—for some small B which de-
termines the efficiency of the reduction. If we require polynomially small B, then we
get a polynomial-time reduction; but the hypothesis that such curves exist and can
be efficiently constructed for arbitrary N is extremely strong, if not wildly overopti-
mistic. If B is simply smaller than N1/2, then we get a reduction that is dominated
by the cost of an equivalent DLP calculation, which is better than nothing; it is not
so hard to construct such curves (as Bentahar does). The middle ground is to ac-
cept subexponential B, and hence a subexponential reduction, as Muzereau, Smart,
and Vercauteren do. Brown [28] takes a more constructive approach, constructing
cryptographic elliptic curves equipped with a polynomially smooth auxiliary curve.
3 Some protocols do use the shared secret S as a key, most notably the textbook
ElGamal encryption presented at the start of §4.
7derives a shared secret key K from a Diffie–Hellman exchange with Bob’s public
key B, and then uses K to communicate with Bob. A malicious Bob might con-
struct an invalid public key B in such a way that K reveals information about
Alice’s secret key a. If (a,A) is ephemeral then Bob has learned nothing useful
about a, since it will never be used again; but the keypair (A, a) is to be re-
used, as in static Diffie–Hellman, then secret information has been leaked, and
Alice thus becomes vulnerable to active attacks (see e.g. [93] for an example).
Public key validation is simple in a finite field: it usually suffices to check the
order of the element. Antipa, Brown, Menezes, Struik, and Vanstone describe
the process for elliptic-curve public keys [7], and their methods extended to most
curve-based algebraic groups without serious difficulty. We will see that this is
a more serious problem in post-quantum systems.
4 Encryption and key encapsulation
The classic ElGamal public-key encryption scheme [56] is closely related to
Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Its key feature is that messages are viewed as
elements of the group G, so adding a random-looking element of G to a message
in G acts as encryption.
Algorithm 3 lets Alice encrypt a message to Bob. Alice first generates an
ephemeral keypair (E, e), completes the Diffie–Hellman on her side using Bob’s
static public key B to compute a shared secret S, which she uses as a (symmetric)
key to encrypt an element of G via M 7→ C = M + S (with corresponding
decryption C 7→ M = C − S). Sending her ephemeral public key E together
with the ciphertext allows Bob to compute S and decrypt with Algorithm 4.
Since the secret key here is the bare shared secret S, untreated by a KDF, the
security of this protocol depends not on the CDHP but rather on the (easier)
decisional Diffie–Hellman problem in G.
Algorithm 3: Classic ElGamal encryption: Alice encrypts to Bob
Input: Bob’s public key B and a message M ∈ G
Output: An element E ∈ G and a ciphertext C ∈ G
1 function ElGamalEncrypt(B,M)
2 (E, e)← KeyPair() // E = [e]P
3 S ← DH(B, e) // B = [b]P =⇒ S = [eb]P
4 C ←M + S // C =M + [eb]P
5 return (E,C)
It is important to note that this cryptosystem does not provide semantic
security. For example, if (E1, C1) and (E2, C2) are encryptions of M1 and M2,
respectively, then (E1+E2, C1+C2) is a legitimate encryption ofM1+M2. While
this property is desirable for certain applications (such as E-Voting [12]), in most
contexts textbook ElGamal cannot be safely used for public-key encryption.
8Algorithm 4: Classic ElGamal decryption: Bob decrypts from Alice
Input: An element E ∈ G, a ciphertext M ∈ G, and Bob’s private key b
Output: A plaintext messge M ∈ G
1 function ElGamalDecrypt((E, C, b))
2 S ← DH(E, b) // E = [e]P =⇒ S = [eb]P
3 M ← C − S // C =M + [eb]P
4 return M
The homomorphic nature of the scheme is due to the fact that the group law
+ is being used as the encryption and decryption algorithm. But even if this
behaviour is actually desired, requiring the message to be an element of G poses
two further problems. First, it imposes a hard and inconvenient limit on the
size of the message space; second, it requires an efficient encoding of messages
to group elements (and an efficient decoding to match). At first glance, this
second requirement seems straightforward for ElGamal instantiated in F×p , since
bitstrings of length ≤ log2 p can be immediately interpreted as integers in Z/pZ,
and hence elements of Fp; but this embedding does not map into the prime-order
subgroups where the protocol typically operates. This complication is worse in
the elliptic curve setting, where the message-length limit is even more restrictive.
The modern, semantically secure version of ElGamal encryption is an ex-
ample of hybrid encryption, best approached through the more general setting
of Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and Data Encryption Mechanisms
(DEMs) [44,79]. We establish encryption keys using an asymmetric system (the
KEM), before switching to symmetric encryption for data transport (the DEM).
Algorithms 5 and 6 illustrate a simple Diffie–Hellman-based KEM. In Algo-
rithm 5, Bob has already generated a long-term keypair (B, b) and published B.
Alice takes B, generates an ephemeral keypair (E, e), completes the Diffie–
Hellman on her side, and derives a cryptographic key K from the shared se-
cret S. She can use K to encrypt messages to Bob4, while E encapsulates K
for transport. To decapsulate E and decrypt messages from Alice, Bob follows
Algorithm 6, completing the Diffie–Hellman on his side and deriving the cryp-
tographic key K from the shared secret S.
Remark 1. While KEMs provide a convenient API and formalism for key es-
tablishment, they cannot always be used as a replacement for plain-old Diffie–
Hellman, especially as a component in more complicated protocols.
5 Concrete groups and discrete logarithms
So far, everything has been presented in the abstract; but if we want to use any
of these schemes in practice, then we need to choose a concrete group G. As we
4 If Alice immediately encrypts a message under K and sends the ciphertext to Bob
with E, then this is “hashed ElGamal” encryption (see [1] for a full encryption
scheme in this style).
9Algorithm 5: DH-based KEM: Alice encapsulating to Bob.
Input: Bob’s public key B ∈ G
Output: A symmetric encryption key K ∈ {0, 1}n and an encapsulation E ∈ G
of K under B
1 function DHEncapsulate(B)
2 (E, e)← KeyPair() // E = [e]P
3 S ← DH(B, e) // S = [eb]P
4 K ← KDF(E ‖ S) // K = KDF(E ‖ [eb]P )
5 return (K,E)
Algorithm 6: DH-based KEM: Bob decapsulating from Alice.
Input: An encapsulation E ∈ G of a symmetric key K ∈ {0, 1}n under Bob’s
public key B ∈ G, and Bob’s private key b ∈ Z/NZ
Output: A symmetric encryption key K ∈ {0, 1}n
1 function DHDecapsulate(E, b)
2 S ← DH(E, b) // E = [e]P =⇒ S = [eb]P
3 K ← KDF(E ‖ S) // E = [e]P =⇒ K = KDF([e]P ‖ [eb]P )
4 return K
noted in §2, the hardness of the DLP (and hence the CDHP) varies according to
the representation of G, and may fall far short of the O(√N) ideal. Here we give a
very brief overview of the main candidate groups for group-based Diffie–Hellman,
and DLP-based cryptography in general. We refer the reader to Guillevic and
Morain’s excellent survey [77] for further detail on discrete logarithm algorithms.
The DLP in prime finite fields, as used by Diffie and Hellman, is subexpo-
nential: the General Number Field Sieve [91] solves DLP instances in Fp in time
Lp[1/3, (64/9)
1/3].5 In extension fields of large characteristic, or when the char-
acteristic has a special form, the complexity is lower, while still subexponential
(see [77]); in the extreme case of extension fields of tiny characteristic, the DLP
is quasipolynomial in the field size [11]. These algorithms can also be used to
attack DLPs in algebraic tori, which are compact representations of subgroups
of F×q which offer smaller key sizes and efficient arithmetic [122,92].
Elliptic curves have long been recognised by number theorists as a general-
ization of the multiplicative group (indeed, both the multiplicative and additive
groups can be seen as degenerate elliptic curves; see e.g. [34, §9]). Once Diffie
and Hellman had proposed their protocol in a multiplicative group, then, it was
perhaps only a matter of time before number theorists proposed elliptic-curve
Diffie–Hellman; and within a decade Miller [102] and Koblitz [83] did just this,
independently and almost simultaneously. The subexponential finite-field DLP
algorithms do not apply to general elliptic curves, and so far we know of no
algorithm with complexity better than O(
√
N) for the DLP in a general prime-
order elliptic curve. Indeed, the only way we know to make use of the geometric
5 Recall that LX [α, c] = exp((c+ o(1))(logX)
α(log logX)1−α).
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structure for general curves over prime fields is to run generic O(
√
N) algo-
rithms on equivalence classes modulo ±1, but this only improves the running
time by a factor of roughly
√
2 [18].6 We can do better for some elliptic curves
defined over some extension fields [74,139,71], and for some small special classes
of curves [100,10,63,128] (notably pairing-friendly curves); but in the more than
thirty years since Miller and Koblitz introduced elliptic curve cryptography, this√
2 speedup represents the only real non-quantum algorithmic improvement for
the general elliptic-curve DLP.7
Going beyond elliptic curves, a range of other algebraic groups have been
proposed for use in cryptography. Koblitz proposed cryptosystems in Jacobians
of hyperelliptic curves as an obvious generalization of elliptic curves [84]. Others
have since suggested Jacobians of general algebraic curves, and abelian vari-
eties [106,119]; but as the genus of the curve (or the dimension of the abelian
variety) grows, index-calculus algorithms become more effective, quickly outper-
forming generic DLP algorithms. At best, the DLP for curves of fixed genus ≥ 3
is exponential, but easier than O(
√
N) [75,129,50,73]; at worst, as the genus and
field size both tend to infinity, the DLP becomes subexponential [57]. De´che`ne
proposed generalized Jacobians as a bridge between elliptic-curve and finite-field
cryptography [46], but these offer no constructive advantage [69].
The groups mentioned above are all algebraic groups : elements are repre-
sented by tuples of field elements, and group operations are computed using
polynomial formulæ. Algebraic groups are well-suited to efficient computation
on real-world computer architectures, but they are not the only such groups: an-
other kind consists of class groups of number fields. Buchmann and Williams
proposed Diffie–Hellman schemes in class groups of quadratic imaginary or-
ders [32], leading to a series of DLP-based cryptosystems set in more general
rings (see [31] for a survey); but ultimately these are all vulnerable to subexpo-
nential index-calculus attacks.
In the classical world, therefore, elliptic curves over Fp and Fp2 and genus-2
Jacobians over Fp2 present the hardest known DLP instances with respect to
group size (and hence key size). Elliptic curves over prime fields have become,
in a sense, the gold standard to which all other groups are compared.
6 Concrete hardness and security levels
It is important to note that our understanding of DLP hardness is not just a
matter of theory and sterile asymptotics; all of the algorithms above are backed
6 More generally, we can work on equivalence classes modulo a (sub)group of auto-
morphisms, as in [54]; but in the case of elliptic curves, for any fixed Fq, there are
only two Fq-isomorphism classes of curves with automorphisms other than ±1.
7 At least, it is the only improvement as far as algorithmic complexity is concerned: im-
plementation and distribution have improved substantially. It is, nevertheless, quite
dumbfounding that in over thirty years of cryptographically-motivated research, we
have only scraped a tiny constant factor away from the classical algorithmic com-
plexity of the DLP in a generic prime-order elliptic curve over a prime finite field.
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by a tradition of experimental work. Recently discrete logarithms have been
computed in 768-bit general and 1024-bit special prime fields [82,64], and in 112-
bit and 117-bit binary elliptic curve groups [138,17]. A table of various record
finite field discrete logarithm computations can be found at [76].
These computations give us confidence in defining cryptographic parameters
targeting concrete security levels against classical adversaries. For example, it is
generally accepted that DLP-based cryptosystems in F×p with log2 p ≈ 3072 or in
E(Fp) with log2 p ≈ 256 for a well-chosen E should meet a classical approximate
128-bit security level: that is, a classical adversary equipped with current algo-
rithms should spend around 2128 computational resources to break the system
with non-negligable probability.
For quantum adversaries, we know that DLPs can be solved in polynomial
time—but we still know relatively little about the concrete difficulty and cost of
mounting quantum attacks against DLP-based cryptosystems, let alone against
candidate post-quantum systems. For example, we mentioned above that the cur-
rent record for Shor’s factoring algorithm is 21; but to our knowledge, Shor’s al-
gorithm for discrete logarithms has never been implemented. Roetteler, Naehrig,
Svore and Lauter have estimated the quantum resources required to compute
elliptic-curve discrete logarithms [120], which is an important first step.
The situation becomes even murkier for the quantum algorithms we will
meet below, including the Kuperberg, Regev, Tani, and Childs–Jao–Soukharev
algorithms. We have asymptotic estimates, but no concrete estimates (or real
data points, for that matter). It is not clear what the most useful performance
metrics are for these algorithms, or how to combine those metrics with classical
ones to estimate overall problem difficulty.
For this reason, we will refrain from giving any concrete security estimates
or recommendations for key-lengths for the post-quantum systems in the second
half of this article. We look forward to detailed theoretical estimates along the
lines of [120], and to the eventual development of quantum computers sufficiently
large to implement these algorithms and get some actual cryptanalysis done.
7 Modern elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman
At first glance, elliptic-curve cryptography is just finite-field cryptography with
a different algebraic group seamlessly swapped in8, and no theoretical modifica-
tion. But Miller’s original article [102] ends with an interesting observation that
departs from the multiplicative group perspective:
Finally, it should be remarked, that even though we have phrased
everything in terms of points on an elliptic curve, that, for the key ex-
change protocol (and other uses as one-way functions), that only the
x-coordinate needs to be transmitted. The formulas for multiples of a
point cited in the first section make it clear that the x-coordinate of a
multiple depends only on the x-coordinate of the original point.
8 Not entirely seamlessly: some operations, like hashing into G, become slightly more
complicated when we pass from finite fields to elliptic curves (see [110]).
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Miller is talking about elliptic curves in Weierstrass models y2 = x3 + ax + b,
where −(x, y) = (x,−y), so x-coordinates correspond to group elements modulo
sign. The mapping (m,x(P )) 7→ x([m]P ) is mathematically well-defined, because
every [m] commutes with [−1]; but it can also be computed efficiently.
In Diffie–Hellman, then, instead of using
A = [a]P , B = [b]P , S = [ab]P ,
Miller is proposing that we use
A = ±[a]P B = ±[b]P S = ±[ab]P
= x([a]P ) , = x([b]P ) , = x([ab]P ) .
Clearly, we lose nothing in terms of security by doing this: the x-coordinate
CDHP reduces immmediately to the CDHP in the elliptic curve. Given a CDHP
oracle for E , we can compute ±[ab]P from (±P,±[a]P,±[b]P ) by choosing arbi-
trary lifts to signed points on E and calling the oracle there; conversely, given
an x-coordinate CDHP oracle, we can solve CDHP instances on E by projecting
to the x-line, calling the oracle there, and then guessing the sign on S.
The idea of transmitting only the x-coordinates may seem advantageous in
terms of reducing bandwidth, but in reality, where elliptic curve point keys are
systematically compressed to an x-coordinate plus a single bit to indicate the
“sign” of the corresponding y-coordinate, there is little to be gained here beyond
avoiding the small effort required for compression and decompression. The real
practical value in Miller’s idea is that working with only x-coordinates is faster,
and requires less memory: x([a]P ) can be computed from a and x(P ) using fewer
field operations than would be required to compute [a]P from a and P .
This advantage was convincingly demonstrated by Bernstein’s Curve25519
software [14], which put Miller’s idea into practice using carefully selected curve
parameters optimized for Montgomery’s ladder algorithm, which computes the
pseudo-scalar multiplications x(P ) 7→ x([m]P ) using a particularly efficient and
regular differential addition chain [103,42]. The result was not only a clear speed
record for Diffie–Hellman at the 128-bit security level, but a new benchmark
in design for key exchange software. Curve25519 is now the Diffie–Hellman to
which all others are compared in practice.
The elliptic curve cryptosystems that were standardized in the 1990s and
early 2000s, such as the so-called NIST [108] and Brainpool [94] curves, are based
on full elliptic curve arithmetic and are not optimized for x-only arithmetic. More
recently, Curve25519 and similar systems have been standardized for future
internet applications [90]. These systems are also preferred in newer practical
applications, such as the Double Ratchet algorithm used for key management
within the Signal protocol for end-to-end encrypted messaging [112].
In theory, Miller’s idea of working modulo signs (or, more generally, automor-
phisms) extends to any algebraic group.9 For example, the quotients of Jacobians
9 While quotienting by ±1 is useful in curve-based cryptosystems, it is counterproduc-
tive in multiplicative groups of finite fields. There, the pseudo-scalar multiplication
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of genus-2 curves by ±1 are Kummer surfaces. Under suitable parametrizations,
these have highly efficient pseudo-scalar multiplications [72], which have been
used in high-speed Diffie–Hellman implementations [16,117].
While the x-only approach to elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman is particularly
useful in practice, it also highlights an important theoretical point: on a formal
level, Diffie–Hellman does not require a group structure.10 By this, we mean
that the group law never explicitly appears in the protocol—and this is precisely
why Diffie–Hellman works on elliptic x-coordinates, where there is no group law
(but where there are maps induced by scalar multiplication).
The group structure is still lurking behind the scenes, of course. It plays
several important roles:
1. Correctness. The group law gives an easy proof that the pseudo-scalar mul-
tiplication operations (m,x(P )) 7→ x([m]P ) exist and commute.
2. Efficiency. The group law induces biquadratic relations on x-coordinates that
we use to efficiently compute pseudo-scalar multiplications using suitable
differential addition chains [15].
3. Security. The hardness of the CDHP in the full group underwrites the hard-
ness of the x-coordinate CDHP.
Remark 2. Can we do without a group entirely? Heading into the pure abstract,
we can consider a Diffie–Hellman protocol with minimal algebraic structure. For
example, we could take a set X of public keys in place of the group G, and sample
private keys from a set F of functions X → X defined by the property11
(a ◦ b)(P ) = (b ◦ a)(P ) for all a, b ∈ F .
The associated Diffie–Hellman protocol is then defined by
A = a(P ) , B = b(P ) , S = a(b(P )) = b(a(P )) .
We need F to be large enough to prevent brute force attacks on S; we must
be able to efficiently sample functions from F , and evaluate them at elements
of X ; and we need to justify the hardness of the associated CDHP. An algebraic
structure on F may not be strictly necessary to ensure all of this, but it certainly
makes life easier.
is (m,P + 1/P ) 7→ Pm + 1/Pm; computing this is slightly slower than computing
simple exponentiations, and saves no space at any point.
10 Buchmann, Scheidler, and Williams later proposed what they claimed was the first
group-less key exchange in the infrastructure of real quadratic fields [29]. Mireles
Morales investigated the infrastructure in the analogous even-degree hyperelliptic
function field case [104], relating it to a subset of the class group of the field; in
view of his work, it is more appropriate to describe infrastructure key exchange as
group-based. In any case, coming nearly a decade after Miller, this would not have
been the first non-group Diffie–Hellman.
11 If we require this property to hold for all P in X , then F is a commutative magma.
Diffie–Hellman protocols where F is equipped with a semigroup or semiring structure
have been investigated [99], though the results are only of theoretical interest.
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8 Principal homogeneous spaces
At the time of writing, the closest thing we have to a post-quantum analogue
of Diffie–Hellman comes from isogeny-based cryptography, whose origins go back
to Couveignes’ “Hard Homogeneous Spaces” manuscript [43]. This went unpub-
lished for ten years, before appearing online more or less at the same time as its
ideas were independently rediscovered by Rostovtsev and Stolbunov [121].
Couveignes’ work is a convenient framework for reasoning about isogeny-
based cryptosystems: the hard detail on class groups and isogeny classes is ab-
stracted away into groups acting on sets. We warn the reader that from now on
we will mostly be working with abelian groups written multiplicatively, which
we denote by G in accordance with the convention from §1.
Recall that a (left) action of a group G on a set X is a mapping G×X → X ,
written (g, P ) 7→ g · P , compatible with the group operation in G: that is,
g1 · (g2 · P ) = (g1g2) · P for all g1, g2 ∈ G and P ∈ X .
In our case G is abelian, so g1 · (g2 · P ) = g2 · (g1 · P ) for all g1, g2, and P .
Definition 3 (PHS). A principal homogeneous space (PHS) for an abelian
group G is a set X equipped with a simple, transitive action of G: that is, for
any P and Q in X , there is a unique g in G such that Q = g · P . Equivalently,
for every P in X , the map ϕP : G→ X defined by g 7→ g · P is a bijection.
Example 1. The trivial example of a PHS is a group acting on itself via its own
group operation: that is, X = G, with g · a = ga.
Example 2. The classic first example of a nontrivial PHS is a vector space acting
by translation on its underlying affine space.
Example 2 illustrates a classic informal definition: a PHS is a group whose
identity element has been forgotten (mislaid, not omitted). Affine spaces have no
distinguished “origin”; on the other hand, as soon as one is (arbitrarily) chosen,
then each point defines an implicit displacement vector, and we can identify the
affine space with a vector space. More generally, for each P in X , if we define
ϕP (g1)ϕP (g2) := ϕP (g1g2) then we get a well-defined group structure on X ; in
fact, we get a different group structure for each choice of P . The idea therefore
is not so much that the identity element has been forgotten, yet might still be
remembered; it is rather that every single element is an equally plausible identity.
Example 3. Let X be the set of points on a curve C of genus 1, and let G =
Pic0(C) be the group of degree-0 divisor classes on C. By the Riemann–Roch
theorem, for every class [D] in Pic0(C) and point P on C, there exists a unique
PD on C such that [D] = [PD − P ]. We therefore have an explicit action of G
on X , defined by [D] · P = PD. If we fix a choice of distinguished “base point”
O in X , then we can identify each class [D] with the point [D] ·O, and thus, by
transport of structure, we get a group law on X . (Cognoscenti will recognise the
definition of the group law on an arbitrary elliptic curve via the Picard group.)
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Our final example of a PHS is fundamental in isogeny-based cryptography.
It is far more complicated to define than Examples 1, 2, and 3; we will give an
extremely brief description here, returning to it in greater detail in §13 and §14.
Example 4. Let q be a prime power and t an integer with |t| ≤ 2√q; let OK
be the ring of integers of the imaginary quadratic field K = Q(
√
∆), where
∆ := t2 − 4q. Let X be the set of Fq-isomorphism classes of elliptic curves E/Fq
whose Fq-endomorphism ring is isomorphic to OK (and where the image of the
Frobenius endomorphism of E in OK has trace t). Then X is a PHS under the
ideal class group G = Cl(OK) of OK , with ideals acting by a · E = E/E [a], where
E [a] is the intersection of the kernels of the endomorphisms in a. This PHS is
central to the theory of Complex Multiplication; there is also a well-developed
algorithmic theory for it, used to compute fundamental number-theoretic objects
such as modular and Hilbert class polynomials (see e.g. [27]).
Example 4 highlights another view of PHSes: we can consider X as a version
of G whose structure is hidden by the maps ϕP . In this case, the elements of X
are j-invariants, and (when the class group is sufficiently large) look like random
elements of Fq; the class group itself has no such encoding.
9 Hard homogeneous spaces
Let X be a PHS under G. From now on we assume we can efficiently compute
group operations, evaluate actions, test equality, and hash elements of G and
X . We also assume we can uniformly randomly sample elements of G. Figure 1
illustrates the two interesting computational problems in this setting, which
Couveignes called vectorization (Definition 4) and parallelization (Definition 5).
Definition 4 (Vectorization). The vectorization problem in a PHS X under
G is, given P and Q in X , to compute the unique g in G such that Q = g · P .
Definition 5 (Parellelization). The parallelization problem in a PHS X un-
der G is, given P , A, and B in X , to compute the unique S in X such that
S = (ab) · P where A = a · P and B = b · P . (Note that then S = a ·B = b ·A.)
Definition 6 (HHS). Let X be a PHS under G. We say X is a hard homo-
geneous space (HHS) if the action of G on X is efficiently computable, but the
vectorization and parallelization problems are computationally infeasible.
The names “vectorization” and “parallelization” are intuitive in the context
of Example 2: vectorization is computing the displacement vector between points
P and Q in the space X , while parallelization is completing the parallelogram
with vertices P , A, and B. These are routine operations in vector and affine
spaces, so the PHS of Example 2 is typically not something that we would
consider an HHS. Similarly, the PHS of Example 3 is not an HHS, because we
can always vectorize by formally subtracting points to form a degree-0 divisor.
Couveignes suggested that the PHS of Example 4 might be an HHS—and with
the current state of classical and quantum class group and isogeny algorithms,
it is.
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Fig. 1. Vectorization (left: finding the unique g such that Q = g ·P ) and parallelization
(right: computing the unique S such that S = b · A = a · B = (ab) · P ). The dashed
arrows denote actions of the unknown group elements g, a, and b.
10 Cryptography in hard homogeneous spaces
On a purely symbolic level, the vectorization problem (P, g · P ) 7→ g in a PHS
bears an obvious formal resemblance to the DLP (P, [x]P ) 7→ x in a group, just
as the parallelization problem (P, a · P, b · P ) 7→ ab · P resembles the CDHP
(P, [a]P, [b]P ) 7→ [ab]P . The presence of abelian groups in each problem suggests
deeper connections—connections that do not necessarily exist. Indeed, we saw
above that parallelization in a PHS is an implicit computation of the group law,
while the Diffie–Hellman operation in a group is something completely different.
But irrespective of the relationship between parallelizations and CDHPs,
this syntactical resemblance allows us to define a cryptosystem analogous to
Diffie–Hellman. Algorithms 7 and 8 define Couveignes’ key exchange in the HHS
setting, with security depending on the hardness of parallelization.
Algorithm 7: Key generation for cryptosystems in an HHS X under G,
with a fixed base point P in X
Input: ()
Output: A private-public keypair (Q, g) ∈ G× X s.t. Q = g · P
1 function KeyPair()
2 g← Random(G) // g is sampled uniformly at random from G
3 Q← g · P
4 return (Q, g)
Algorithm 8: Diffie–Hellman in an HHS X under a group G
Input: A private key gA ∈ G and a public key QB ∈ X , each generated by calls
to Algorithm 7
Output: A shared secret value S ∈ X
1 function DH(QB , gA)
2 S ← gA ·QB
3 return S
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Algorithms 7 and 8 immediately raise some important restrictions on the
kinds of G and X that we can use. The first is that we need some kind of
canonical representation for elements of X , to ensure that Alice and Bob can
derive equal shared cryptographic keys from the shared secret S. This property is
also important in settings where public keys are required to be unique for a given
private key. We also need to be able to efficiently draw uniformly random samples
from G; and then, given a random element of G, we need to be able to efficiently
compute its action on arbitrary elements of X . An alternative approach is to
repeatedly randomly sample from a subset of efficiently-computable elements of
G, building a sequence of such elements to be used as the secret key, with the
action of the key being the composition of the action of its components. This
approach requires an argument that the distribution of these compositions is
sufficiently close to the uniform distribution on the whole of G. Both approaches
are relevant in isogeny-based cryptography, as we will see in §14.
Many CDHP-based cryptosystems have obvious HHS analogues. We can de-
fine an HHS-based KEM (and implicitly, a hashed-ElGamal-type public key
encryption scheme) along the lines of Algorithms 5 and 6, by replacing the calls
to Algorithms 1 and 2 with calls to Algorithms 7 and 8, respectively. But not
all DLP-based protocols have HHS-based analogues: for example, the obvious
HHS analogue of Schnorr’s signature scheme [123] would appear to require an
efficient (decisional) parallelization algorithm in order to verify signatures.
HHS-Diffie–Hellman is not a natural generalization of group-Diffie–Hellman.
As we noted in §7, in group-DH, we have a ring (integers modulo N) acting on
the group G; the composition operation at the heart of DH is ring multiplication,
but the ring only forms a group under addition. Formally, in group-DH we only
use the fact that the scalars form a commutative magma; but algorithmically,
we exploit the fact that the elements form an abelian group and the scalars form
a commutative ring, mapping addition in the ring onto the group law, in order
to efficiently evaluate scalar multiplications using addition chains.
More concretely, we noted in §8 that the maps ϕP : g 7→ g · P can be seen
as hiding the group G in X . The parallelization (P, a · P, b · P ) 7→ ab · P can
be written as (ϕP (1), ϕP (a), ϕP (b)) 7→ ϕP (ab); that is, parallelization computes
the group law in the hidden representation of G in X corresponding to P . From
this perspective, HHS-Diffie–Hellman is a hidden version of the ridiculous key
exchange where the shared secret is the product of the two public keys: obviously,
without the hiding, this offers no security whatsoever.
11 Vectorization and parallelization
To argue about the security of the schemes in §10, we must address the following
questions: how hard are vectorization and parallelization? What is the relation-
ship between these problems, and to what extent does our common intuition
relating the DLP and CDHP carry over to vectorization and parallelization in
the PHS setting?
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It might seem excessive to require the simple and transitive action of a PHS in
all this: we could relax and set up the same cryptosystems with a group G acting
on a set X in any old way. While we might lose uniqueness and/or existence of
vectorizations and parallelizations, many of the arguments in this section would
still go through. However, using PHSes instead of general group actions makes
one thing particularly simple: the proof of random self-reducibility for vectoriza-
tion and parallelization is identical to the usual arguments for groups, which we
sketched in §5. More precisely: if an algorithm successfully solves vectorizations
in (G,X ) with a probability of 1/M , then we can solve any vectorization in
(G,X ) with an expected M calls to the algorithm. Given a target vectorization
(P,Q = g · P ) 7→ g, we attempt to solve (a · P, b ·Q) 7→ abg for randomly chosen
a and b in G; we expect to land in the subset of inputs where the algorithm
succeeds within M attempts, and then recovering g from (a, b, abg) is trivial.
This means that the average- and worst-case difficulties for vectorization are
equivalent; a similar argument yields the same result for parallelization.
Now, consider the relationship between vectorization and parallelization. If
we can solve vectorizations (P, g ·P ) 7→ g, then we can can solve parallelizations
(P, a ·P, b ·P ) 7→ ab ·P , so parallelization is notionally easier than vectorization.
As we have seen, the parallelization operation (P, a ·P, b ·P ) 7→ ab ·P acts as
the group law induced on X by G when elements are hidden by ϕP : g 7→ g · P .
Given a parallelization oracle for a PHS (G,X ) with respect to one fixed base
point P (call this P -parallelization), we can view X as an efficiently computable
group, and thus apply any black-box group algorithm to X . Further, given an effi-
cient P -parallelization algorithm, the map ϕP becomes an efficiently computable
group homomorphism. Even further, if we have a P -parallelization oracle for all
P in X , then the mapping (g, P ) 7→ g · P becomes an efficiently computable
bilinear pairing G×X → X (viewing X as a version of G hidden by one ϕO).
The efficient homomorphism ϕP : G → X implied by a P -parallelization
oracle is of course an isomorphism (because #X = #G), but its inverse is not
necessarily efficient12: if it were, then we could solve vectorizations (P, g ·P ) 7→ g
because g = ϕ−1P (g · P ). Conversely, if we can vectorize with respect to P , then
we can invert ϕP : the preimage ϕ
−1
P (T ) of any T in X is the vectorization of T
with respect to ϕP (1). Parallelization therefore yields an efficient isomorphism
in one direction, while vectorization yields the inverse as well.
In the case where a group G has prime order, we can use a CDHP oracle to
view G as a black-box field in the sense of Boneh and Lipton [20]. Given a base
point P in G, each element [a]P of G is implicitly identified with its discrete
logarithm a. The Diffie–Hellman operation (P, [a]P, [b]P ) 7→ [ab]P becomes an
implicit multiplication, allowing us to view G as a model of FN , and thus to
apply various subexponential and polynomial-time reductions from the DLP to
the CDHP in G (as we noted in §3). A parallelization oracle for (G,X ), however,
only allows us to view X as a black-box group, not a black-box field; we therefore
have no equivalent of the den Boer or Maurer reductions in the HHS setting.
12 The term one-way group action is used for the HHS framework in [35] and [22]. This
hints at a more general setting, where actions are not necessarily simple or transitive.
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The separation between vectorization and parallelization therefore seems
more substantial than the somewhat thin and rubbery separation between the
DLP and CDHP. However, we would still like to have some upper bounds for
the hardness of these problems. For vectorization, we can give some algorithms.
In the classical setting, Couveignes noted that Shanks’ baby-step giant-step
(BSGS) and Pollard’s probabilistic algorithms for DLPs in groups extend to
vectorizations in PHSes. Algorithm 9 is a BSGS analogue for a PHS X underG.13
Given P and Q = g ·P in X and a generator e for (a subgroup of) G, Algorithm 9
computes an exponent x such that g = ex, if it exists (if g lies outside the
subgroup generated by e, then the algorithm will fail and return ⊥).
Algorithm 9: BSGS for a PHS X under (a subgroup of) a group G.
Input: Elements P and Q in X , and an element e in G
Output: x such that Q = ex · P , or ⊥
1 function BSGS(P,Q, e)
2 β ← ⌈
√
#〈e〉⌉ // May be replaced with an estimate if #〈e〉 not
known
3 S ← {} // Hash table: keys in X, values in Z/NZ
4 T ← P
5 for i in [0, . . . , β] do
6 S [T ]← i
7 T ← e · T
8 (T, c)← (Q, eβ)
9 for j in [0, . . . , β] do
10 if T ∈ S then
11 i← S [T ]
12 return i− jβ // ejβ ·Q = ei · P
13 T ← c · T
14 return ⊥
Vectorization in a PHS X under G can always be solved classically in time
and space O˜(
√
#G) using Algorithm 9 and random self-reducibility, provided a
generator of a polynomial-index subgroup of G is known. Algorithm 9 does more
than what is required: it returns not just the desired vectorization g, but the
discrete logarithm of g with respect to e. This betrays the fact that Algorithm 9
is just a black-box group algorithm operating on a hidden version of G.
Pollard’s algorithms also generalize easily to the HHS setting, because we can
compute the pseudorandom walks using only translations, or “shifts”, by group
elements. These translations in the group setting can be replaced by actions by
13 Algorithm 9 becomes the usual BSGS for DLPs in G = 〈e〉 if we let X = G (with
the group operation as the action), let P = 1, and let Q be the discrete log target.
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the same elements in the HHS setting. The space complexity of vectorization
can thus be reduced to as little as O(1) for the same time complexity.
Moving to the quantum setting: despite its resemblance to the DLP, vec-
torization cannot be solved with Shor’s algorithm. In fact, vectorization is an
instance of the abelian hidden shift problem [136]: given functions f and g such
that f(x ·s) = g(x) for all x and some “shift” s, find s. The hidden shift instance
corresponding to the vectorization instance (P,Q = g ·P ) has f = ϕP : G→ X ,
g = ϕQ : G → X , and s = g. Kuperberg reduces the abelian hidden shift
problem to an instance of the dihedral hidden subgroup problem, which is then
solved with a quantum algorithm with a query complexity of LN [1/2, c], where
c =
√
2 according to [37]. Kuperberg’s original algorithm [88] uses subexponen-
tial space; Regev’s simpler algorithm [116] uses polynomial quantum space; and
Kuperberg’s most recent work [89] uses linear quantum space, but subexponen-
tial classical space. More detailed perspectives on these algorithms in the context
of the isogeny class HHS appear in [35,60,22].
12 The difficulty of exploiting subgroup structures
Moving back to the abstract: when we think about DLPs, in black-box or in
concrete groups, we implicitly and systematically apply the Pohlig–Hellman–
Silver algorithm to reduce to the prime-order case. It is interesting to note that
for PHSes, no such reduction is known: it appears difficult to exploit the subgroup
structure of G when solving vectorization problems in X .14
Algorithm 10 presents the Pohlig–Hellman–Silver algorithm for discrete log-
arithms in a group G whose order has known factorization N =
∏
iN
ei
i . Line 9
applies a DLP-solving algorithm (like BSGS, Pollard ρ, or a specialized algo-
rithm for a concrete group) in the order-Ni subgroup of G. If the factorization is
complete and the Ni are prime, then the global DLP is reduced to a polynomial
number smaller prime-order sub-DLPs.
The key steps involve producing the subgroup DLPs. Lines 3 and 4 project
the DLP instance (g, h) into the order-Neii subgroup of 〈g〉. Lines 7 and 8 then
produce a DLP instance in the order-Ni subgroup. This is always done by ex-
ponentiation by N/Neii and Ni; indeed, this is the only way that the factors Ni
are used in the algorithm.
In the PHS setting, subgroup DLPs should be replaced with subgroup vec-
torizations. Line 9 could be replaced with a call to Algorithm 9, using eN
ei−1
i
as the subgroup generator; the problem is to produce a vectorization instance
in a sub-PHS acted on by the corresponding subgroup. We cannot naively con-
catenate “·P” (or “·Q”) to most lines of the algorithm to turn group elements
and operations into PHS elements and operations: Line 4, for example, would
14 It might seem odd that some black-box group algorithms like BSGS and Pollard ρ
adapt easily to PHSes, but not others like Pohlig–Hellman. But looking closer, BSGS
and Pollard ρ in groups only require translations, and not a full group law. We can
therefore see BSGS and Pollard ρ not as black-box group algorithms, but rather as
black-box PHS algorithms that are traditionally applied with X = G.
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Algorithm 10: Pohlig–Hellman–Silver for a group G whose order has
known (partial) factorization.
Input: An element e of G, a g in 〈e〉, and ((N1, e1), . . . , (Nn, en)) such that
#G = N =
∏n
i=1N
ei
i , with the Ni pairwise coprime and the ei > 0.
Output: x such that g = ex
1 function PohligHellman(e, g, ((N1, e1), . . . , (Nn, en)))
2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
3 ei ← e
N/N
ei
i
4 gi ← g
N/N
ei
i
5 xi ← 0
6 for j in (ei − 1, . . . , 0) do
7 s ← ei
(Ni)
j
// s is in the order-Ni subgroup
8 t← s−xi · g
(Ni)
j
i // t is in the order-Ni subgroup
9 y ← logs(t) // Use e.g. baby-step giant-step
10 xi ← xiNi + y
11 x← CRT({(xi, N
ei
i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n})
12 return x
require computing gN/N
ei
i · P from Q = g · P , P , and g, but this amounts to an
iterated parallelization—and parallelization is supposed to be hard in an HHS.
A thorough investigation of the possibility and difficulty of exploiting sub-
group structures for vectorization and parallelization would require working with
subgroup actions on quotient spaces; we do not have room to discuss this here.
We note, however, that in some protocols a limited number of exploitable par-
allelizations are provided by the protocol itself, as in the group-based protocols
subject to Cheon’s attack [36], and this should have some consequences for the
security of any HHS analogues of these protocols.
13 A quick introduction to isogenies
This section provides enough background on isogenies and endomorphisms of
elliptic curves to make sense of the HHS from Example 4 before we describe
cryptosystems based on it in §14. We also want to fill in some background on
supersingular curves before we need it in §15. We assume a basic familiarity
with the arithmetic of elliptic curves; readers familiar with isogenies and isogeny
graphs can safely skip this section. As a mathematical reference, we suggest [127]
and [86]; for greater detail focused on the cryptographic use case, see [59].
We want to talk about relationships between elliptic curves over a fixed finite
field Fq, where q is a power of some prime p. We can assume that p 6= 2 or 3,
to simplify, though the theory applies to those cases as well. We will work with
elliptic curves as short Weierstrass models E : y2 = x3+ax+b, with a and b in Fq:
in practice we might compute using other curve models (many isogeny-based
cryptosystem implementations have preferred Montgomery arithmetic [42]), but
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since we end up working with curves up to Fq-isomorphism, and every curve is
Fq-isomorphic to a short Weierstrass model, we lose nothing in restricting to this
simple and universal curve shape in this article. The m-torsion E [m] of E is the
subgroup of points P such that [m]P = 0E .
A homomorphism φ : E → E ′ is, by definition15, a rational map such that
φ(0E) = 0E′ . Homomorphisms induce homomorphisms on groups of points [127,
§III.4], but not every homomorphism of groups of points is induced by a homo-
morphism of curves. An Fq-homomorphism is one that is defined over Fq: that is,
the rational functions defining it as a rational map have coefficients in Fq. Every
homomorphism here will be defined over Fq, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Isogenies are nonzero homomorphisms of elliptic curves. If there is an isogeny
from E to E ′, then we say that E and E ′ are isogenous. We will see below that for
each isogeny E → E ′ there is a dual isogeny E ′ → E , so isogeny is an equivalence
relation on elliptic curves.
Isomorphisms are invertible homomorphisms. The j-invariant of a curve E :
y2 = x3+ax+ b is j(E) = 1728 · 4a34a3+27b2 ; two curves E and E ′ are Fq-isomorphic
if and only if j(E) = j(E ′). We need to work with the stronger notion of Fq-
isomorphism, where the j-invariant does not tell the whole story. Curves that
are Fq-isomorphic but not Fq-isomorphic are called twists. The most important
example is the quadratic twist, which is isomorphic over Fq2 but not Fq: the
quadratic twist of E : y2 = x3 + ax + b is E ′ : v2 = u3 + µ2au + µ3b, where
µ is any nonsquare in Fq (the choice of nonsquare makes no difference up to
Fq-isomorphism, which is why we say the rather than a quadratic twist). The
isomorphism τ : E → E ′ is defined by (x, y) 7→ (u, v) = (µx, µ3/2y); this is clearly
not defined over Fq, yet j(E) = j(E ′). The quadratic twist of a curve E is its only
twist, up to Fq-isomorphism, unless j(E) = 0 or 1728 (in which case there may
be four or two more twists, respectively). Specifying an Fq-isomorphism class
therefore comes down to specifying a j-invariant and a choice of twist.
Endomorphisms are homomorphisms from a curve to itself. The endomor-
phisms of a given curve E form a ring End(E), with the group law on E inducing
addition of endomorphisms and composition of endomorphisms corresponding
with multiplication. The structure of the set of isogenies from E to other curves
is deeply connected to the structure of End(E), and vice versa.
The scalar multiplication maps [m] are endomorphisms, so End(E) always
contains a copy of Z. It also includes the Frobenius endomorphism π : (x, y) 7→
(xq, yq), which satisfies the quadratic equation χ(X) := X2 − tX + q = 0 for
some integer t in the Hasse interval [−2√q, 2√q]; we call t the trace of Frobenius
(and of E). Since points in E(Fq) are precisely the points fixed by π, we have
#E(Fq) = χ(1) = q+1− t. If E ′ is the quadratic twist of E and we pull back the
15 An elliptic curve is by definition a pair (E , 0E), where E is a curve of genus 1 and 0E
is a distinguished point on E (which becomes the identity element of the group of
points; cf. Example 3); so it makes sense that a morphism (E , 0E)→ (E
′, 0E′ ) in the
category of elliptic curves should be a mapping of algebraic curves E → E ′ preserving
the distinguished points, that is, mapping 0E onto 0E′ .
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Frobenius on E ′ to an endomorphism on E via the twisting isomorphism, then
the result is −π, so the trace of E ′ is the negative of the trace of E .
Now consider the set of all elliptic curves over Fq. Tate’s theorem tells us that
two elliptic curves are Fq-isogenous if and only if they have the same trace (and
hence the same number of rational points). This means that the set of all elliptic
curves is partitioned into Fq-isogeny classes, indexed by the integers in the Hasse
interval (via the trace). Since the trace of a curve over Fq is the negative of the
trace of its quadratic twist, and the quadratic twist is generally the only twist,
we can use the j-invariant to uniquely identify elements of the isogeny class of
trace t 6= 0 up to Fq-isomorphism, even though j normally only classifies curves
up to Fq-isomorphism. We can handle j = 0 and 1728 as rare special cases, but
for the case t = 0 we need to be more careful.
Now let us focus on a single Fq-isogeny class. The isogeny class immediately
breaks up into a union of Fq-isomorphism classes. The modern way of looking
at an Fq-isogeny class is as a graph, with Fq-isomorphism classes of curves for
vertices, and Fq-isomorphism classes of isogenies for edges (isogenies φ1 : E1 → E ′1
and φ2 : E2 → E ′2 are isomorphic if there are isomorphisms ι : E1 → E2 and
E ′1 → E ′2 such that φ2 ◦ ι = ι′ ◦ φ1).
Tate’s theorem is not constructive, so we generally don’t know how to get
from one point to another in an isogeny graph. The difficulty of computing a
path representing an unknown isogeny between given elliptic curves in the same
isogeny class is the source of most hard problems in isogeny-based cryptography.
To take a closer look at the structure of isogeny graphs we need to classify
isogenies, and to break them down to into fundamental components. Our main
tool for this is the degree. Since an isogeny φ : E → E ′ is defined by nonconstant
rational maps, it induces an extension φ# : Fq(E ′) →֒ Fq(E) of function fields;
the degree deg(φ) of φ is defined to be the degree of that extension. (We extend
the definition of degree to homomorphisms by defining the degree of zero maps
to be 0.) If φ : E → E ′ and φ′ : E ′ → E ′′ are isogenies, then deg(φ′ ◦ φ) = deg φ ·
deg φ′. Two examples are particularly important: deg[m] = m2, and deg π = q.
If deg φ = d, then we say that φ is a d-isogeny.
Another important quality of isogenies is (in)separability, which we define
according to the (in)separability of the corresponding function field extension.
For our purposes, the purely inseparable isogenies are all iterated compositions
of p-powering (x, y) 7→ (xp, yp) (such as Frobenius); these can be factored out of
any other isogeny, and then what remains is separable.
Suppose S is a finite subgroup of E(Fq). Now S must include 0, and it is also
fixed by [−1]; so S is determined precisely by the x-coordinates of its nonzero
elements. We can therefore encode S as a polynomial FS(X) =
∏
P (X − x(P )),
where the product runs over the nonzero points P of S in such a way that P
is included iff −P is not. The subgroup S is defined over Fq if and only if the
polynomial FS has coefficients in Fq.
Being homomorphisms, isogenies have kernels. The kernel of an isogeny φ :
E → E ′ is always a finite subgroup of E . If φ is separable, then #kerφ = degφ.
The points of kerφ are generally defined over an extension of Fq, but kerφ can
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be encoded as the kernel polynomial Fkerφ, which is defined over Fq. Separable
isogenies are defined by their kernels, up to isomorphism.
Going in the other direction, given a finite subgroup S of E defined over Fq,
there exists a separable quotient isogeny φ : E → E/S with kerφ = S. The
isogeny and the curve E/S are both defined up to Fq-isomorphism; they can be
computed using Ve´lu’s formulæ [137]. (If S is encoded as the polynomial FS ,
then we compute φS using the symmetric version of Ve´lu’s formulæ in [86, §2.4].)
Given an ideal a ⊂ End(E), we can consider the subgroup E [a] := ∩ψ∈a kerψ.
This is the kernel of an isogeny φ : E → E/E [a]; the isogenies that arise in this
way are central to the key exchange of §14. The degree of φ is the norm of a in
Z ⊂ End(E). If a = (ψ) is principal, then φ is isomorphic to ψ.
Given any d-isogeny φ : E → E ′, we can compute the subgroup S = φ(E [d]) ⊂
E ′, and then the quotient φS : E ′ → E ′/S is a d-isogeny such that φS◦φ has kernel
E [d]; hence, φS is isomorphic to a d-isogeny φ† : E ′ → E such that φ† ◦ φ = [d]
on E (and φ ◦φ† = [d] on E ′). We call φ† the dual of φ. The upshot is that every
d-isogeny E → E ′ has a corresponding d-isogeny E ′ → E .
Every isogeny can be factored into a composition of isogenies of prime de-
gree, though there are two important caveats: factorization is not unique, and
generally a factorization may only exist over some extension field. For example,
if ℓ 6= p is prime, then E(Fq) ∼= (Z/ℓZ)2, so there are ℓ + 1 order-ℓ subgroups
S ⊂ E(Fq)[ℓ], each the kernel of a different isogeny φS : E → E/S, and then the
dual isogeny gives us a factorization [ℓ] = φS
† ◦ φS . Each decomposition is only
defined over the field of definition of the associated subgroup S.
Just as we decompose isogenies into ℓ-isogenies, so consider the subgraphs
formed by ℓ-isogenies. The structures of ℓ-isogeny graphs depend strongly on the
endomorphism rings of curves in the isogeny class, as we will see.
A curve E is supersingular if p divides its trace (over Fp, this implies the
trace is 0). If E is not supersingular, then it is ordinary. The j-invariant of any
supersingular curve is in Fp or Fp2 , so any supersingular curve is isomorphic to
one defined over Fp or Fp2 . There are roughly ⌊p/12⌋ supersingular j-invariants
in Fp2 , of which O(
√
p) are in Fp (more precisely, this number is the class number
of Q(
√−p)). Since supersingularity is defined by the trace, either all of the curves
in an isogeny class are supersingular, or all of them are ordinary; the two kinds
of curves do not mix.
There are two possibilities for the general structure of the endomorphism
ring of an elliptic curve over a finite field:
commutative End(E) is isomorphic to an order in a quadratic imaginary field;
or
noncommutative End(E) is isomorphic to a maximal order in a quaternion
algebra.
All ordinary curves have commutative endomorphism rings. If a supersingular
curve is defined over Fp, then its endomorphism ring is commutative
16; if it is
defined over Fp2 , then its endomorphism ring is noncommutative.
16 If we consider endomorphisms defined over Fp2 , then the ring is noncommutative.
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The commutative case is relatively simple: each End(E) is an order in K =
Q(π) containing the quadratic ring Z[π]. The discriminant of Z[π] is ∆π := t
2−
4q = m2∆K , where ∆K is the fundamental discriminant of K. The algorithmic
exploration of ordinary isogeny graphs begins with Kohel’s thesis [86, Chapter 4];
these graphs are now mainstream computational tools in the arithmetic of elliptic
curves and elliptic curve cryptography [66,61,67,81]. The analogous theory for
supersingular curves over Fp, whose endomorphism rings are commutative and
thus behave like ordinary curves, was explored by Delfs and Galbraith [47].
If φ : E → E ′ is an ℓ-isogeny of endomorphism rings with commutative
endomorphism rings (with ℓ prime), then there are three possibilities: End(E) ∼=
End(E ′) (we say φ is horizontal), End(E) ⊂ End(E ′) with index ℓ (we say φ is
ascending), or End(E) ⊃ End(E ′) with index ℓ (we say φ is descending). An
ℓ-isogeny can only be ascending or descending if ℓ divides the conductor m of
Z[π] in OK , and an ℓ-isogeny φ : E → E ′ can only be horizontal if End(E) and
End(E ′) are locally isomorphic to the maximal order OK of K at ℓ: that is, if
End(E)⊗Zℓ ∼= End(E ′)⊗Zℓ ∼= OK ⊗Zℓ. The ℓ-isogenies of ordinary curves thus
form “volcano” structures: cycles of horizontal isogenies link the curves E with
End(E) ∼= OK , and from each of these curves a regular tree grows downwards,
with its leaves in the curves with End(E) ∼= Z[π] (which is minimal). The vertices
with End(E) ∼= OK have two horizontal ℓ-isogenies (or one or zero, if the cycle is
degenerate), and ℓ− 1 descending isogenies; each other vertex has one ascending
and ℓ descending isogenies, except for the minimal vertices, which have no further
descending isogenies.
From our perspective, what is most interesting about the commutative case
is that the (isomorphism classes) of curves E with End(E) ∼= OK form a PHS
under the action of the class group of Cl(OK). We met this PHS in Example 4.
The noncommutative case is much more complicated, and we will be much
more brief here. The algorithmic applications of the full supersingular isogeny
graph go back to Mestre and Oesterle´ [101], and more detail appears in the
second half of Kohel’s thesis [86, Chapter 7]. In the non-commutative case, the
ℓ-isogeny graph is (ℓ + 1)-regular and connected, and it is an expander graph.
14 Commutative isogeny-based key exchange
Recall the PHS space from Example 4, which Couveignes conjectured was an
HHS: fix a prime power q and an integer t with |t| ≤ 2√q, set ∆ := t2 − 4q, and
let OK be the maximal order (the ring of integers) of the quadratic imaginary
field K := Q(
√
∆). For this HHS,
– the space X is the set of isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over Fq of
trace t whose endomorphism rings are isomorphic to OK ;
– the group G is the ideal class group Cl(OK) of OK ; and
– the action (a, E) 7→ a · E is evaluated by computing the isogeny φ : E →
E/E [a], and taking a · E to be the isomorphism class of E/E [a].
The cardinality N of G is the class number of OK , which is roughly
√
∆K , where
∆K is the discriminant of K (essentially the squarefree part of ∆). There is no
26
point in not maximising N with respect to q, so we should use t such that ∆ is
already a fundamental discriminant; this forces all curves in the isogeny class to
have Z[π] = End(E) = OK , and then N = #G ∼ √q.
The vectorization and parallelization problems in this HHS are expressed
concretely in terms of computing paths in isogeny graphs. The fastest known
classical algorithms for vectorization and parallelization in this HHS are the
generic square-root algorithms, which run in time O( 4
√
q). In the quantum world,
Childs, Jao, and Soukharev have defined a subexponential quantum isogeny
evaluation algorithm [37], which in combination with Kuperberg’s algorithm
gives a full subexponential quantum algorithm for solving vectorization in this
HHS. This applies identically to the ordinary and commutative-supersingular
cases. Further analysis of this approach can be found in [22].
Couveignes defined a key exchange (essentially Algorithms 7 and 8) and an
identification protocol in this HHS in [43]. These protocols were essentially un-
known outside the French community until Rostovtsev and Stolbunov indepen-
dently proposed a public key encryption scheme based on the same HHS [121].
Stolbunov [130] then derived more protocols, including an interactive key ex-
change scheme similar to Algorithms 7 and 8. The only real difference between
Couveignes’ and Stolbunov’s cryptosystems is in the sampling of private keys,
each representing one of the two approaches mentioned in §10. Couveignes uses
a true uniform random sampling over the whole of the keyspace, then applies a
lattice reduction-based algorithm to produce an equivalent key whose action is
efficiently computable. Rostovtsev and Stolbunov sample keys from a subset of
efficiently computable keys whose distribution they conjecture to be close enough
to the uniform distribution on the entire group.
One particularly nice aspect of these schemes is that key validation can be
made simple and efficient (see [60, §5.4]), so we can safely use the scheme for
static key exchange. Since the group action is simple and transitive, every ele-
ment of the space is a legitimate public key. To validate a given x in Fq as a
public key, therefore, it suffices to check that x is the j-invariant of a curve with
endomorphism ring OK . We immediately construct a curve E with j-invariant
x, and check that it has the right trace (which amounts to checking that E(Fq)
has the claimed cardinality), switching to the quadratic twist if necessary. This
ensures that End(E) ⊆ OK ; if t is chosen such that Z[π] = OK , then we are
already done; otherwise, we check End(E) = OK using Kohel’s algorithm [86].
Regardless of how the private key ideals are sampled, by the time we want
to use them in the group action they are presented as factored ideals
a =
r∏
i=1
leii with −Bi ≤ ei ≤ Bi ,
where the li are distinguished prime ideals whose corresponding ℓi-isogenies can
be evaluated very quickly. If the cost of evaluating an isogeny associated with
kernel E [li] (for a random E in the isogeny class) is Ci, then the exponent bounds
Bi should be chosen in such a way that the cost of evaluation
∑r
i=1 BiCi is
minimised while keeping the number of private keys
∏r
i=1(2Bi + 1) big enough.
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Suppose then that want to compute an ℓ-isogeny from an elliptic curve E/Fq
for some prime ℓ 6= p. We consider two methods of computing ℓ-isogenies here.
The classic approach is based on modular polynomials. An alternative approach
based on Ve´lu’s formulæ was originally proposed in [60], and subsequently used
in [35]. Both approaches are discussed in greater detail in [60, §3.2].
First, consider the “modular” approach. Recall that the ℓ-th (classical17)
modular polynomial Φℓ(J1, J2) is defined over Z, is monic of degree ℓ + 1 in
both J1 and J2, and the roots of Φℓ(j(E), X) in Fq are the j-invariants of the
curves ℓ-isogenous to E over Fq. In fact, the Fq-irreducible factors correspond
to Galois orbits of ℓ-isogenies (or, equivalently, to Galois orbits of order-ℓ sub-
groups of E). To compute the ℓ-isogenous curves up to isomorphism, therefore,
we (pre)compute Φℓ and reduce it modulo p; then we evaluate one variable at
j(E), and compute the roots in Fq of the resulting univariate polynomial.
There are ℓ + 1 curves ℓ-isogenous to E over Fq. Of these isogenies, at most
two can preserve the endomorphism ring. If we choose E such that End(E) is
the maximal order and equal to Z[π] (or at least such that ℓ does not divide the
conductor of Z[π] in OK , so Z[π] is locally maximal) then Φℓ(j(E), X) will have
only two roots, corresponding precisely to these horizontal isogenies. If this is
the first step in a walk of ℓ-isogenies then we must determine which of the two is
in the “correct” direction, corresponding to the ideal; we can do this by checking
the eigenvalue of Frobenius on the kernel, for example. But if we have already
started walking, then there is no need to do this: we know that the “wrong”
isogeny is the dual of the preceding step, so we just ignore the j-invariant of
that curve. The total cost of this approach is dominated by finding the roots of
Φℓ(j(E),Fq), which is O(ℓ log q) Fq-operations.
The alternative “Ve´lu” approach is to construct isogeny kernels explicitly,
and compute the corresponding isogeny steps using Ve´lu’s formulæ [137]. The
idea is simple: suppose E(Fq) contains a point Pℓ of order ℓ; we want to compute
the isogeny E → E/〈Pℓ〉 with kernel generated by Pℓ. We can compute the kernel
polynomial F (X) =
∏(ℓ−1)/2
i=1 (X − [i]Pℓ) in O˜(ℓ) Fq-operations; if Pℓ is defined
over a small extension of Fq, say Fqk , then the cost is O˜(k
2ℓ) Fq-operations. We
can then apply Ve´lu’s formulæ (as in [137] or [86, §2.4]) to compute an equation
for E/〈Pℓ〉; we do not need an expression for the isogeny itself. The total cost is
dominated by the cost of computing F , which is O˜(k2ℓ) Fq-operations.
The Ve´lu approach is much faster than the modular approach when k2 ≪
log q, but it requires us to use isogeny classes of curves with many small-order
subgroups over very low-degree extensions. Such curves are rare, and hard to
find by exhaustive search: constructing them presents similar challenges to the
construction of pairing-friendly curves (though here we want many small primes
dividing the order over a degree-k extension, rather than one big prime). We
might try to do better by using the CM method [3,131], which constructs elliptic
curves with a specified group order—but the CM method only works when the
17 We use classical modular polynomials here for simplicity, but alternative modular
polynomials such as Atkin’s, which have smaller degree, are better in practice. These
degrees are still in O(ℓ), so the asymptotic efficiency of this approach does not change.
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discriminant∆K of the maximal order (and hence the class group of the maximal
order) is very small, because #Cl(OK) ∼
√
| −∆K |. This means that if we use
the CM method to generate parameters, then the private key space is far too
small for these cryptosystems to be secure. In [60] curve parameters are selected
by running an extensive search to maximise the number of primes ℓ with points
in E [ℓ](Fqk) for smallish k, using the Ve´lu approach for these primes and the
modular approach for the others. This gives a significant improvement over the
pure modular approach, but the result is still far from truly practical.
CSIDH [35] steps around this obstruction in an extremely neat way, by
switching to supersingular curves over Fp. Since their endomorphism rings are
commutative quadratic orders, these curves behave like ordinary curves, and
the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov protocol carries over without modifica-
tion. However, the fact that these curves necessarily have order p + 1 makes it
extremely simple to control their group structure and class group size by ap-
propriately choosing p from within the desired range. This close control means
that we can force all of the small primes to be “Ve´lu” with k = 1, which re-
sults in a speedup that beats ordinary-curve constructions like that of [60] by
orders of magnitude. Key validation is also simpler for these curves. We are un-
aware of any impact on security, negative or positive, stemming from the use
of supersingular curves as opposed to ordinary curves; so far, each attack de-
scribed as targeting either CRS or CSIDH (e.g. [22]) applies equally to the other.
CSIDH therefore represents a practical post-quantum Diffie–Hellman replace-
ment, though the development of efficient side-channel-aware implementations
of commutative isogeny protocols remains an open problem.
15 Supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman
We conclude with a brief discussion of Jao and De Feo’s supersingular isogeny
Diffie–Hellman, known as SIDH [80,45]. On the surface, SIDH resembles the
commutative isogeny key exchange of §14: Alice and Bob each compute a se-
quence of isogenies to arrive at their public keys, and later the shared secret.
However, the differences are striking.
The most fundamental difference is that the endomorphism rings in SIDH
are noncommutative, so the algebraic objects acting on the isogeny class are not
abelian groups: SIDH falls squarely outside the HHS framework. In particular,
Alice and Bob’s isogeny walks do not automatically commute; some extra data
must be passed around to correctly orient their walks for the second phase of
the key exchange.
The second crucial difference with commutative isogeny key exchange is that
the underlying ℓ-isogeny graphs are no longer cycles; rather, each is (ℓ + 1)-
regular, connected, and an expander graph. Since there are Θ(p) vertices, com-
puting random sequences of O(log p) ℓ-isogenies from a given base curve takes
us to a distribution of curves that we expect to be close to a uniform random
distribution on the isogeny class.
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To define the protocol, we fix distinct primes ℓA and ℓB (these will be very
small, typically 2 and 3), and exponents nA and nB, respectively, and let p be a
prime such that p = c · ℓnAA · ℓnBB ± 1 for some very small c. We want to choose ℓA
and ℓB such that ℓ
nA
A and ℓ
nB
B are roughly the same size; ideally, ℓ
nA
A ∼ ℓnBB ∼
√
p.
Now consider the supersingular isogeny class over Fp2 : every curve E in it has
E [ℓnAA ] ∼= (Z/ℓnAA Z)2 and E [ℓnBB ] ∼= (Z/ℓnBB Z)2. Fix a base curve E0 in the isogeny
class, along with bases (PA, QA) of E0[ℓnAA ] and (PB , QB) of E0[ℓnBB ].
First, key generation. Alice samples a random a in Z/ℓnAA Z as her private
key; the point PA + [a]QA has exact order ℓ
nA
A , and generates the kernel of an
ℓnAA -isogeny φA : E0 → EA ∼= E0/〈PA + [a]QA〉, which she computes as a series of
ℓA-isogenies. Her public key is (EA, φA(PB), φA(QB)). Bob samples a private key
b in Z/ℓnBB Z and computes the ℓ
nB
B -isogeny φB : E0 → EB ∼= E0/〈PB + [b]QB〉 as
a series of ℓB-isogenies; his public key is (EB , φB(PA), φB(QA)). There is plenty
of redundant information in these public keys, and they can be compressed
following the suggestions in [40].
To complete the key exchange, Alice computes the ℓnAA -isogeny φ
′
A : EB →
EBA = EB/〈φB(PA) + [a]φB(QA)〉, and Bob computes the ℓnBB -isogeny φ′B :
EA → EAB = EA/〈φA(PB) + [b]φA(QB)〉. The shared secret is the j-invariant
j(EAB) = j(EBA) in Fp2 ; the curves EAB and EBA have the same j-invariant be-
cause both are isomorphic to E0/〈PA + [a]QA + PB + [b]QB〉. The relationships
between these curves is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman.
Jao, De Feo, and Pluˆt specified efficient algorithms for SIDH in [45]. The first
competitive public implementation was due to Costello, Longa, and Naehrig [41].
A lot of effort has since been put into improving the algorithmic and space
efficiency of SIDH [40,39,58], and optimizing arithmetic in its specialized finite
fields [25,24]. One particlarly nice feature of SIDH in comparison to commutative
isogeny DH is that the isogenies in SIDH all have degree either ℓA or ℓB; both are
fixed, and typically tiny, so computing the individual isogeny steps is much faster
in the supersingular protocol, and requires much less code and precomputation.
Recovering the private key from an SIDH public key—a noncommutative
analogue of vectorization—amounts to computing an isogeny between the base
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curve E0 and the target public key curve EA. We can do this using an algo-
rithm due to Delfs and Galbraith [47], inspired by an algorithm for the ordinary
case due to Galbraith, Hess, and Smart [67]. The algorithm walks randomly
through the supersingular isogeny graph from the starting and ending curves,
until curves defined over Fp are detected—and then finding a path between those
two curves, to complete the desired isogeny, is analogous to breaking a CSIDH
key (though with completely different security parameters). Alternatively, Adj,
Cervantes–Va´zquez, Chi–Dominguez, Menezes, and Rodr´ıguez–Henr´ıquez have
given a useful analysis of the van Oorschot–Wiener algorithm applied to this
problem [2]. The asymptotic cost of either approach is in O( 4
√
p) Fp2 -operations
if ℓnAA ∼ ℓnBB ∼
√
p. In the quantum setting, we can apply Tani’s claw-finding
algorithm [133] to find a curve in the intersection of the sets of curves ℓ
nA/2
A -
isogenous to E0 and EA with a query complexity of O(ℓnA/3A ) (or we can attack
Bob’s public key in O(ℓ
nB/3
B )), which is O(p
1/6) when ℓnAA ∼ ℓnBB ∼
√
p. The fact
that the subexponential Childs–Jao–Soukharev algorithm does not apply in the
noncommutative case was one of the motivations for developing SIDH.
But SIDH keys do not simply present the target curve of an unknown isogeny:
they also present images of distinguished torsion bases, which may help crypt-
analysis [113]. The precise nature of the cryptographic problems underlying
SIDH is quite complicated, but Urbanik and Jao’s survey of these problems
provides useful analysis [135], while Eisentraeger, Hallgren, Lauter, Morrison,
and Petit go further into the connections with the endomorphism ring [55].
Finding an isogeny between two supersingular curves over Fp2 is equivalent
to determining their endomorphism rings, under reasonable heuristics [55,86,87].
This makes an interesting contrast with the commutative case, where the endo-
morphism rings are presumed known, and in any case can be computed using
Kohel’s algorithm [86]. As we have seen, determining the endomorphism ring is
an important step in public key validation in commutative isogeny key exchange.
Key validation is especially problematic for SIDH. Suppose we have an al-
gorithm which, given a prime ℓ, a positive integer n, and a curve E , efficiently
decides whether E is ℓn-isogenous to E0. Such an algorithm would allow us to
verify whether Alice or Bob’s public key was honestly generated (by calling
the algorithm on (ℓA, nA, EA) or (ℓB, nB, EB), respectively). However, as we see
in [70, §6.2] and [134], this algorithm can also be used to efficiently recover se-
cret keys from public keys. Indeed, take Alice’s public curve EA; there are ℓA+1
curves ℓA-isogenous to it. Computing each of these isogenies φ : EA → E ′A, we
call the algorithm on (ℓA, nA − 1, E0, E ′A); if it returns true, then φ is the last
ℓA-isogeny in Alice’s secret key. Iterating this procedure reveals the entire key.
Problematic key validation makes defining a CCA-secure SIDH-based KEM
more complicated than the equivalent in the commutative case. SIKE [9], which
is the only isogeny-based candidate KEM in the NIST process, handles this
by applying the Hofheinz–Ho¨velmanns–Kiltz a variant of the Fujisaki–Okamoto
transform [78,65] to SIDH; this entails a nontrivial performance hit.
On a formal level, there are some profound differences between SIDH and
classical Diffie–Hellman. The most obvious is the lack of symmetry in SIDH be-
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tween Alice and Bob, whose roles are no longer interchangeable. This is reflected
by their distinct and incompatible key spaces, which are in turn distinct from
the shared secret space and the space the base curve lives in. Alice’s private key
encodes a sequence of ℓA-isogenies of length nA, while Bob’s encodes a sequence
of ℓB-isogenies of length nB. Alice’s public key belongs to the space of (isomor-
phism classes of) elliptic curves equipped with a distinguished ℓnBB -torsion basis,
while Bob’s is equipped with an ℓnAA -torsion basis instead. The base curve E0 is
drawn from yet another space: it is equipped with an ℓnAA ℓ
nB
B -torsion basis.
This asymmetry might seem like a curious but minor inconvenience: the
participants just need to decide who is Alice and who is Bob before each key
exchange. More importantly, though, this asymmetry is incompatible with most
of the theoretical machinery that we use to reason about Diffie–Hellman and its
hardness. We have already seen how group Diffie–Hellman oracles create black-
box field structures on prime-order groups, while HHS Diffie–Hellman oracles
create a black-box group structures. In SIDH, however, a Diffie–Hellman oracle
defines no binary operation on any set, let alone an interesting algebraic struc-
ture. This plurality of spaces makes it hard to adapt hidden-number-problem-
style arguments [21,5] for hardcore bits to the SIDH context in a natural way,
though a valiant effort has been made by Galbraith, Petit, Shani, and Ti [68].
Remark 3. At first glance, the fact that SIKE is the only isogeny-based KEM
submitted to the NIST post-quantum process, competing with 58 others mostly
based on codes, lattices, and polynomial systems, might suggest that it is a
strange outlier. However, this uniqueness is not so much an indicator of lack of
support, so much as a sign of rare convergence and consensus in the elliptic-curve
cryptography community—convergence that did not occur to the same extent
in the communities working on other post-quantum paradigms. The fact that
there was only one isogeny-based submission reflects the general agreement that
this was the right way to do isogeny-based key agreement at that point in time.
The more flexible CSIDH scheme was not developed until later, when the NIST
process was already underway, and so it was not part of the conversation.
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